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SPEECH

OF

MR. CRITTENDEN, OF KENTUCKY,

ON THE OREGON QUESTION.

Delivered in the Senate of the United States, April 16, 1846.

Mr. CRITTENDEN said, he was very sensible, notwithstanding the importance of the subject, that the Senate were much too weary of this debate to take much interest in its further discussion. Did he consult his own inclinations, he should not obtrude himself for a single moment on their attention; but, having had the honor of originally introducing the resolution which is the immediate subject to be acted upon, it seemed incumbent on him to say something in its support before the vote was taken. He should endeavor to confine himself to those considerations which seemed essential to a proper decision of the policy and propriety of giving to Great Britain the proposed notice for the abrogation of the treaty or convention made with her by the United States for the joint occupancy of the Oregon territory.

That territory lies on the northwest coast of this continent, between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific ocean, and extends from the 42d degree of north latitude to the parallel of 54° 40'. Through it flow two large rivers—the Columbia and Frazer's river—the former emptying itself into the ocean between the latitudes of 46° and 47°, and the latter between 49° and 50°.

This is the territory now in dispute between the United States and Great Britain, and which has been disputed between them for nearly forty years past.

Our claim is rested on two grounds—first, *prior discovery* of the mouth of the Columbia river in 1792 by Capt. Gray, an American navigator—the subsequent exploration of that river by Lewis and Clarke, under the order and authority of the United States, in 1805 and '6, and settlements made at or near the mouth of the same river by American citizens in 1809 and 1810. This, for the purpose of distinction, may be called our own *American* title, and it will be perceived that it applies only to the Columbia river, and that *portion* of the territory which is drained by it.

The second ground of our claim is the Florida treaty, made between the United States and Spain in the year 1819, whereby Spain ceded to the United States all her "rights, claims, and pretensions" to the territory in question. Those "rights, claims, and pretensions" are founded on the discoveries and explorations of her navigators, and these are now alleged on the part of our Government as embracing and giving us a title to the whole of Oregon.

In opposition to these claims, the British Government assert rights in Oregon, founded also on alleged discoveries, explorations, and settlements of her navigators and subjects, and sanctioned and sustained, as they contend, by the Nootka Sound Convention, made between Great Britain and Spain in 1790. The British were the first to explore and make settlements on Frazer's river, as we were the first to explore and make settlements on the Columbia.

The explorations and discoveries of the Spanish navigators, in virtue of which Spain set up claim to the whole northwest coast of America, were long antecedent to those made either by the English or Americans; but it is insisted by Great Britain, that Spain did not follow up those discoveries and explorations by such acts of *occupation* or *settlement* as could alone confer on her a national title to the country.

Such is the brief and general outline of the claims of the United States and Great Britain, and of the dispute existing between them in respect to the territory of Oregon. For a period of near forty years these parties have asserted their conflicting claims, and repeatedly endeavored, but without success, to settle the controversy by agreeing upon some permanent line of division. In these negotiations, the ablest and most eminent statesmen of both countries have been employed, and almost every question of

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fact and of national law that could affect the acquisition of title to newly-discovered countries has been considered as involved in this controversy, and has been discussed with the greatest learning and ability.

The first difficulty in these discussions was to investigate and ascertain the true state of the *facts* and *circumstances* alleged as the grounds of the respective claims. This, to some extent, was to be traced by the doubtful evidence furnished by the narratives of early navigators, of voyages along the northwest coast, of occasional landings, setting up of crosses, and other symbolical and equivocal acts of possession, settlement, and ownership. But when that difficulty was overcome, and where the facts were indisputable, the still greater difficulty remained of giving to each of those facts and circumstances its proper appreciation and effect, and determining the nature and extent of the territorial right it conferred in that vast and unappropriated region.

These difficulties have hitherto prevented the United States and Great Britain from agreeing upon any amicable adjustment of their claims.

I do not intend to enter into any investigation or argument of those conflicting claims. They still remain as subjects for diplomatic discussion and negotiation, and so long as that is the case, it seems to me that such discussions in the Senate would be somewhat premature and inappropriate, and more likely to embarrass than to aid our Government in the conduct of its negotiations on the subject. I shall therefore refrain from pronouncing any opinion on the claims in question, further than this, that it does seem to me, that whether we consult the law of nations, or the dictates of our own reason, the only good and valid grounds of title to newly-discovered territory are actual occupation and settlement. Discovery may give the right to occupy and settle, but occupation and settlement only can give title. According to these principles, our own proper American title to the Columbia river, and the country drained by it, extending at least to the 49th degree of latitude, stands on more clear and distinct ground than that which we derive from the Spanish claim to the residue of the territory in question.

Such are the sources, and such the general character, of the claims of the United States and Great Britain to the Oregon territory. To ascertain the state and present condition of the controversy, in respect to which we are now called upon to act, it will be proper to advert for a moment to the proceedings and negotiations that have taken place on the subject between the Governments of the two countries.

As early as 1807, Mr. Jefferson, by instructions to our Ministers at the Court of St. James, manifested his earnest desire that the boundary line of 49° north, which had been agreed on as the line of division between the United States and Great Britain on this side of the Rocky Mountains, should be extended across them to the Pacific ocean. But this could not then be effected.

In 1818, a further attempt was made to adjust the claims of the two nations, by agreeing upon a line of division between them; but failing in this, the negotiation terminated in a convention, to continue in force for ten years; by which it was agreed that the territory should be open and free to the citizens and subjects of both; that, in effect, there should be, for the stipulated period, a joint *occupation* by both nations, without prejudice to the *rights* of either.

This convention was made expressly "to prevent disputes and differences," concerning which the parties could not then agree upon any final settlement.

In 1823, another unsuccessful attempt was made by negotiation to agree upon some line of division.

In 1827, when the convention of joint occupancy for ten years was about to expire another negotiation was opened, and a further attempt made to settle the controversy by establishing some line of partition and boundary. But the parties being still unable to agree on any such line, the negotiation ended in an agreement to continue indefinitely the convention of 1818, with the privilege reserved to either party to abrogate it upon giving one year's notice to the other.

To settle this long continued dispute another negotiation was recently undertaken, in the course of which each party proposed a line of division, which was rejected by the other. And upon this mutual rejection of the *first propositions* of the parties, the negotiation, though not broken off, seems to have been suspended, without further effor

for a settlement, except that the British made, and the President rejected, a proposition for arbitration of the controversy. Since this suspension, in the summer of the last year, the negotiators on the part of the two Governments appear to have been standing still, on some ground of policy or ceremony, each apparently waiting for the other to take the first step.

In all our negotiations on this subject, we have constantly offered to adopt the 49th parallel of latitude, and the British Government as constantly offered to adopt the Columbia river as the line of division; and so far neither party has been willing to accede to the boundary offered by the other. The consequence has been that the Oregon Territory has remained, as it now is, in the joint occupation of the parties, in virtue of the conventions of 1818 and 1827.

The President, in his message at the commencement of our present session, announces the result of the late negotiation, and recommends that Congress shall make provision for his giving notice to Great Britain for the abrogation of the convention of joint occupancy, at the expiration of twelve months.

The question now before us is, whether we shall make that provision. I regret that the question has been agitated now. But for that agitation, and its probable consequences, the convention, though it could not long have remained suitable to the changed and changing condition of Oregon, might, perhaps, have sufficed for some time to come. And, in my judgment, it was the best policy of the United States to have continued it in force as long as it was found safe and practicable so to do; because whatever may have been the state of things in the territory in time past, it is certainly true that recently the emigration to Oregon is mainlyfrom the United States. Under the silent operation of this continued emigration, we should have had, whenever the question of title came to be settled by arms, if that were unavoidable, a power on the spot quite capable of maintaining their own rights. Our settlers would have spread themselves over the territory; and, although I grant that this would not have increased or strengthened, or in any manner affected our legal right to the country, yet it would, in fact, have afforded a strong practical support to such rights as we had. We should have had a strong power on the spot, not easily expelled, and whose possession would soon and quietly have settled in our favor all questions of conflicting titles.

But, as things now stand, we have no power to choose. The question has been brought into the arena of our party strifes, and the attempt has been made to identify it with them. Who is it that has thus prematurely agitated this question? By what means has it been effected? I do not ask these questions in any spirit or with any design of reproaching any body: I speak only of the fact; and I again ask, by whom has this question been thus prematurely introduced? How is it that, instead of being reserved as a matter for diplomatic arrangement, this question, so purely *national*, has been perverted into a scheme of *party* agitation for *party* purposes? It was done by the Democratic Convention which nominated the present Chief Magistrate as a candidate for the Presidency. That assembly, in the hurry of its proceedings, and without other care or thought on the subject than whether it might aid their party nomination, as a sounding manifesto, *resolved*, that our title to Oregon—the whole of Oregon—was clear and unquestionable, and thus attempted to make it the tenet of a party creed, and impose it as such upon the country. And now, sir, we are told here, on the floor of this chamber, in this Senate of the United States, that the Senators belonging to the Democratic party, and the whole party as a body, and the Executive himself as chosen by them, are bound by this resolution; that they would be treacherous, and the President most of all, to the extent that they dared to depart from it. It is by these means that this Oregon question has become matter of ardent party discussion and party action in both Houses of Congress and throughout the country. I think it would have been better had we remained quiet under the existing convention for some years to come. The controversy could then have been reopened with better means and better prospects on our part. But that is now no longer possible. A feeling has been gotten up, here and elsewhere, that will spread westward till it has passed the Rocky Mountains and taken possession of our settlers there. They are interspersed promiscuously with the subjects of Great Britain in the territory, and both will soon become animated by the

feelings which prevail in their respective countries. Neighbors, who have heretofore lived in harmony and mutual good will, will come to regard each other with a hostile spirit, difficulties will spring up, and they will be prepared, on both sides, to settle their quarrels by a resort to force; blood will be shed, and a war will be forced upon us, whether we will or not.

To prevent such consequences, this question must be disposed of in some way. Shall we dispose of it by adopting the measure recommended to us by the President? I believe, under the circumstances, that peace will be less endangered by giving the notice he asks, than by leaving the matter as it is. The reasons for this are, I think, sufficiently obvious. The objection to giving the notice proposed is, that it will not facilitate negotiation; that it is a measure unfriendly in its aspect; that it will be so regarded by England, and will operate to diminish the chances of a peaceful settlement of the difficulty. In itself, the notice is not an unfriendly measure; it is a conventional provision. We bargained with Great Britain for the right to give such a notice whenever we pleased, and we conceded to her a similar right on her part. But, though not a hostile measure in itself, it may, by the terms in which it is expressed, be made to have the appearance and the tone of defiance; while, on the other hand, the terms in which it is given may clearly show that it is designed only as a means of amicable settlement. Its hostile character, if it has any, must arise from the circumstances thrown around it, or from the tone and manner in which it is conveyed. Extraneous circumstances alone can possibly expose it to the interpretation of being an unfriendly measure. If, then, the measure be not hostile in itself, and if the terms in which it is given, instead of menace or defiance, breathe only the spirit of peace, how can it be considered as offensive; and why should we suppose beforehand that it will be so understood? It is said that it will not facilitate a settlement. However that may be, it certainly will not increase the danger of war. It is certainly true that, after all, when we shall have given the notice in the most amicable spirit and terms, we may nevertheless fail in the negotiation, and war may be the result. But, if war does come, it will not be in consequence of the notice now proposed: it will be the effect of the controversy itself; it will be the result of ill temper on the one side or the other, and a want of WISDOM in managing the affair.

We have negotiated from 1807 until now, nearly forty years, and yet without any practical result. And why? Because for a long time past—ever since the year 1818—the subject and the parties have been under the shelter and protection of that convention which we now propose to annul—a convention which, during its continuance, secured to both parties equal enjoyment of possession, and preserved, without prejudice, their ultimate rights.

In this condition of things, all attempts at a definite and final settlement of the conflicting claims of the parties have been but empty diplomacy, and wholly without consequence; because each party could safely withdraw from it if it was not pleased with the terms offered.

If this has been the result for more than thirty years, is it not likely to continue to be so if the negotiation is conducted under the like circumstances? Great Britain is now in the joint occupation of the territory with us. She will derive from the division of the territory less advantage than she now enjoys. Will she not rather have the present state of things continue? Certainly she will: it is natural she should, and, so long as the convention continues, all negotiation between us will be without consequence, as it is without responsibility. Either party can safely retire from it, and wait for a better prospect of success. But, when the convention shall have been abrogated, the subject then becomes practical, and negotiation, instead of being mere theory, hypothesis, and diplomatic logic, becomes a sensible, respectable, effectual thing; and, instead of either party having a shelter to fly to whenever the course of the negotiation has an unfavorable aspect upon its interests, both of them must look each other solemnly in the face, under the conviction that, unless they can agree, the result may, and probably must be, war.

Here, then, they will feel themselves to be acting under an awful responsibility. Is it hoping too much to anticipate that, when the shelter is taken from both, and a practi-

al appeal is made to them in behalf of peace, by the sacrifices which must attend a war—is it, I say, too much to hope that, thus pressed, they may come to some amicable arrangement? At all events, I ask, does the continuance of both parties, under the cover of this convention, promise an easier future to either? No, sir. Now that we have departed from that quiet policy, under which our people, in the natural course of their increasing emigration, would soon have spread over and possessed themselves of the country; now that the agitation and excitement of the subject has been obtruded on the country, the sooner we settle it the better. Every day, every hour, will more probably increase rather than diminish the difficulties of a settlement. What, then, shall we gain by refusing the notice? That which we put off to day, from the apprehension of danger at a distance, we must approach to-morrow under danger increased by delay. Why, then, not meet it at once?

If we have unwisely precipitated upon ourselves the necessity of abrogating the convention, there will, perhaps, result to us one advantage from its abrogation, in this, that then the emigration and settlement of our people in Oregon will enure exclusively to our benefit, and the confirmation of our title. Though the great mass of emigrants must go from the United States to that country, yet, under the operation of the convention, so long as it continues in force, the settlement there of our people is but part of the joint occupancy of the United States and England, and operates to the equal benefit of both. It gives us no exclusive right, any more than the settlement of one joint tenant on the joint estate would give him an exclusive right. So long as that convention continues every settler holds the country as much for England as for the United States. Every American emigrant holds possession with one foot only for his own country, and, with the other, for England. When the convention is abolished the settlements made by our people will be our sole possession, and enure exclusively to our benefit; and the advantage to us will be in proportion to the greater number of emigrants that will go from the United States than from England.

It appears to me, Mr. President, that the prospect of an amicable adjustment will be improved, not obstructed, by the notice, if it be given in terms of amity, and without circumstances of offence.

In the situation into which we have been hurried, by impatience and impolicy, we can perhaps take no course that is entirely free from danger. The danger is upon us. We have stirred it up. We cannot now avert it by inaction. We cannot now stand still. While we hesitate and delay it will thicken around us. The safest course for us, in the midst of these difficulties, is to go forward with this notice, and, confronting boldly and at once the unavoidable perils in our way, endeavor, by a last, decided, and yet conciliatory negotiation, to settle, peacefully and permanently, this long-continued controversy. I am persuaded that the danger of putting the dispute upon that issue will be less than the danger that will result from leaving the whole matter to the irritations and accidents of the future, and to the imminent chances of collision between the American and British inhabitants of Oregon.

Do gentlemen suppose that our countrymen in Oregon, Americans by birth, children of the American soil, and trained under our free institutions, can hear the fervent voices, the warlike declamation and fierce denunciations of England, and all her claims to Oregon, that are uttered in this Hall, without having all their sympathies and feelings aroused? No, sir, that cannot be. Those speeches and denunciations will be read in Oregon, and will have an influence upon its American population, increased by all the enchantments that distance and recollections of their far-off native land can give. That influence will, too, probably lead them to look with jealousy and hostility upon their British neighbors, and to regard them as intruders and enemies. Collisions between them would soon follow; and all can see how readily a petty, obscure conflict there, might kindle war between the United States and Great Britain.

This state of things will be guarded against by giving the notice now. When the people in the territory know that their joint occupation is soon to end, and that the subject is under discussion by their respective Governments, they will be content to wait, and to wait quietly, till they see the end arrived at. Thus the two Governments will retain the question in their own hands; but, rely upon it, if you cast it off the people

will take it up. You may avoid danger here for a moment, but you create danger at a distance, and permit a state of things to arise under which the convention which you refuse to annul must soon annul itself. That treaty, when made, may have been, and I think was, wise. I cannot agree with some gentlemen who have expressed an opposite opinion. The convention, in my judgment, was a wise one when made; it was demanded by the circumstances and by the interests of both countries. But, however judicious it may then have been, it is inapplicable to the present state of things. It was then an almost uninhabited wilderness. Now settlements, both American and British, have been formed, and are forming, which may require the control and protection of law; and yet, according to the terms of the convention of joint occupancy, neither the United States nor Great Britain can do more than legislate for its own citizens or subjects. And when both have legislated, to the utmost of their power under the convention, what a picture of government would it present? English laws prevailing over English settlers, and American laws governing American settlers; and the two classes of settlers intermingled in daily intercourse and the nearest connexion. Instead of a Government preserving peace, protecting rights of person and property, and administering justice, it will be, rather, a legal invitation to collision and disorder. Its very feebleness will be a provocation to violence—a constant source of irritation naturally leading to outrage. Supposing a dispute arises or a wrong is done, it cannot be settled before an English judge, because the American settler will never submit to English jurisdiction. It cannot be settled before an American judge, because the English settler will make the like refusal. What peace, then, can there be in such a conflict of laws and jurisdictions? It can lead only to anarchy; it can prove only a source of "confusion worse confounded." The time has come when the territory is fast becoming peopled—when there exists, instead of a few scattered hunters, a social community; and law is becoming necessary to its safety and well being. The territory has passed from that condition when the convention was sufficient for its necessities and adapted to its circumstances. The time has arrived when each portion of the community must take that which is its own, and must be subject to one exclusive jurisdiction. For these reasons I am in favor of a notice. I regret, as I said at first, the necessity for giving it at this time, but it is now irretrievable. Given it must be, in some form; and if we give it in the form now proposed, I feel a strong hope, a confident hope, that the whole difficulty can and will be settled.

When we shall have authorized the notice proposed, we shall have placed the whole subject at the disposal of the President. It is his business to conduct diplomatic negotiations; to take care of our territorial rights and interests, and watch for the preservation of peace. Clothed with this authority and these responsibilities, he has recommended that we authorize him to give this notice. He asks for it at our hands as a measure calculated to render negotiations more effectual. He has told us that his course will be directed to the preservation of the peaceful relations of the country. Can it then be, that he asks for this measure merely that he may bring on more speedily and surely a state of war? No, this cannot have been his motive. I say so, because, in the very same message in which he recommends the notice, he expresses his hope of an amicable settlement. This is strong evidence; but we have evidence yet stronger in the action of the President. I am confident that he did not intend a war; for is it conceivable, if he had, that he could have so far forgotten every obligation of duty, and the most obvious dictates of common sense, as not to have recommended to Congress some measures to provide for the defence of the country?

The whole course of the Administration seems to imply, that whatever danger of war we may see, or think we see, whether in the Executive message or in the diplomatic correspondence, and whatever uncertainty, apprehension, and excitement may prevail in the country, there never has been, in the view of the President and his confidential advisers, any real danger. While all is apprehension, and uncertainty, and inquiry, and surprise out of doors, the Administration seem to sit in the recesses of the White House in all the confident serenity of assured peace. They neither take themselves, nor advise us to take, a single step which looks towards a preparation for war. I infer, and the inference seems to me irresistible, that the purpose and the expectation

of the Executive is peace. And it is in this spirit that I will believe that the President has asked for this notice, to strengthen his hands in negotiating, by taking off the covert afforded to both parties by the existing convention. When that is done, the two nations will come up to the question in the full view of the responsibilities of peace and war.

Does any gentleman think that great, and bold, and fearless as both nations may be, and are, that such a posture of things will exert no solemn, no pacific influence upon them? They must be more or less than men if it did not. Not that this will operate, or is intended to operate as a pressure, appealing to the apprehensions of either party. Its appeal is to motives and feelings far higher and nobler than mere personal fear. It demands no sacrifice of national honor, none; it only summons their attention to a solemn and immediate consideration of the great questions of peace and war. If those who conduct a negotiation under such circumstances deserve the name of statesmen; if they have one of the high qualities which ought to inspire men so entrusted, they cannot but feel the influence of their solemn position. They will then be dealing with no feigned issue, as they were, so long as the cover of the convention was over the heads of both. It is the real and the solemn issue of peace or war between two great and powerful nations. I cannot believe, when they stand side by side in the immediate view of such an issue, with a prospect in the distance of all the consequences which must follow—consequences which are to be the immediate work of their own hands—that it will have no ennobling, no elevating effect upon their thoughts, no purifying influence upon their feelings and their motives? Passion, and pride, and selfishness must be awed and silenced by the sense of such a solemn responsibility. It would shame the wisdom of the age—it would disgrace the morality of both countries, to believe that such a question cannot be amicably arranged between them. I look upon the result of this measure to be peace between us. I understand the notice to be recommended with that view. I give it in the spirit of peace and of conciliation in which it was asked. It is the best measure toward peace which is now left to us; and, though there may be danger in it, yet I think that the danger is less than would result from the other course. Let us not meet the case with the folly of rash and reckless men, but as wise men should meet a crisis of their country—with moderation, with firmness, and in such a temper that we may be prepared to meet the issue before both God and man.

If this dispute between the United States and Great Britain be not settled amicably, there must be a grievous fault somewhere. With the President will rest the responsibility of conducting, on our part, all negotiations for the settlement of that dispute, and on him may depend the issues of peace or war. Let him look well to it. If he shall fail to do all his duty; if, entrusted as he is with the peace as well as the rights of such a people, he shall omit to do all within his power to preserve both, and shall, by acts of commission or omission, plunge his country into an unnecessary war, how fearful will be his responsibility! If war shall come, let him see to it that he is prepared to show that he has offered all fair and reasonable terms of peace, or let him be assured that a departure from his duty can have, and will meet with, no apology. No party promise, no party pledge, no Baltimore resolutions, will be admitted by his country and the civilized world as an excuse for a needless war. He will be amenable to a higher tribunal than an assembly of party politicians. The people of the United States will be his judges; nay, the people of the whole civilized world will sit upon his conduct; it is before them he will have to stand. The page of history will record the sentence.

The President has the whole history of this case before him; he knows all that has been done. The patriots, the sages, the pure and practical statesmen of our own country, who in former times treated of this subject, have all agreed upon the same line as a boundary between us and England. Mr. Jefferson desired the parallel, which was our northern limit east of the Rocky Mountains, to be extended westward to the sea. Mr. Jefferson went for 49°. In 1818 your Government, in its negotiation with England, offered her 49°. In 1823 you again offered 49°. In 1827 you repeated your offer of 49°; and again in 1844 you proposed to her 49°. The British Government as often offered you the Columbia river. The President has this in all its details before him.

Whether he shall insist on extreme pretensions, or shall, with firmness but moderation conduct negotiation with a view to the amicable settlement of our difficulties, he is amenable to the judgment of his country. He has the whole field before him. There is a way that leads to peace; there is a way that leads to war—both open before him; let him choose, at his peril.

The matter in dispute involves no question of national honor. It is simply a question of boundary; and, in such a case an honest statesman, before proceeding to the extremity of war, would stop a little to compare the value and importance of the territory in dispute with the cost and consequences of that war. "Greatly to find a quarrel in a straw," is a sort of ambition to which the world no longer gives countenance. All such heroics have passed away, and have given place to the juster sentiment which requires of the statesman and ruler, entrusted with the interests and happiness of his country, to save and protect it from the calamity of *unnecessary* war.

Be the value of this territory what it may, the dispute about it is but a question of *property*, unmixed with any point of honor. It is as purely a question of property as a dispute between two neighbors about the line between their farms. Are they recreant to all sense of honor, if they do not rush into the court-house and litigate the matter to the end? Is there any honor in spending all they have upon a lawsuit? Who thinks so? Who will reproach and contemn them if they come to a pacific adjustment of their dispute? I say that this question of Oregon is as purely a question of property as theirs; as clearly and solely a question of property as ever was between nations.

If there were any great question of principle involved, as the honorable Senator from Texas (Mr. HOUSTON) very justly remarked, if this was a clear question of the national honor, then the cost, even to the sacrifice of life itself, ought not to be counted. But when there is no principle of honor in the matter, where it is a mere dispute about property, ought we not—I put it to every man in his sober senses—ought we not to count the cost?

I do not design to exaggerate the consequences of war—much less should I think of presenting here affecting pictures of its horrors and desolations. I lay no stress upon these. Let them all be laid out of the question. Still, war is an evil. You may deck it out in gorgeous colors, glittering dress, and waving plumes, and drown its cries and its groans in the loud blast of the trumpet and in the shouts of victory; still, sir, still war is a mighty evil. It breaks up the relations of nations, involves them in immense and ruinous expenditures, loads them with heavy burdens of taxation, checks all industry and commerce, and puts a stop to all social and physical improvements. And shall a consideration of all this form no part or portion of the motives of national action? If, indeed, war built school-houses, and meeting-houses, and dug canals, and stretched out railroads; if it fostered institutions for purposes of education or charity, and cherished the interests of trade, of commerce, and of art, then it would be a thing to be sought after. But as its effect and operation is directly the reverse of this, is it not just, and wise, and right to avoid it, when it can be avoided without a sacrifice of honor?

Here is a territory four thousand miles off, lying upon another ocean, whose commercial connexions are on the other side of the world; for the most part a barren and unbroken wilderness. I do not speak to deprecate its value; I speak but naked truth: the fact is so. Of what great consequence is the immediate possession of such a region to the people of the United States? And what are the consequences of going to war for it? Let both questions be looked at. Let us not foolishly and wilfully shut our eyes to them. I do not say we are to look at them with dread and horror—far from it. But, if danger approaches, let us not act like children, who hide their faces to get clear of seeing what they fear. Let us look the danger in the face like men. He only is prepared for danger who can look at it steadily, with that composure and intrepidity which become a man. Look at the consequences. Determine whether you will go to war to enforce your claim to the "whole" of the disputed territory of Oregon, rather than settle the dispute on principles of compromise and upon terms of partition like those which for near forty years past we ourselves have repeatedly offered.

Is this to be a small war? Is it to be a war confined to the territory of Oregon? Let us see.

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from it. But,
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We are said to be rather a boastful people, but, abating whatever you will on that score, it is not to be denied that this is a great and a powerful nation; of vast moral and physical energy; and capable of applying the whole of that energy to any contest in which it may engage. England also is a great Power. Will a war between two such nations be a small war? As it has been proudly said of her, that the sun never sets upon her dominions, so it may be said that the sun will never set upon this war. Its havoc will be throughout the world. There is no ocean, or sea, or shore, where its echoes will not be heard.

What debt will it not leave behind it? Will it be a war of short duration—of a day or a year? The honorable Senator from South Carolina (Mr. CALHOUN) is more competent than I am to hazard a calculation on either point. How long will it last? Our first war lasted seven years. If the duration of the war is to be in proportion to the abilities of the parties, how long, I ask again, will it last? And what will be our condition at the end of it? Ought we to refuse to look at this? Do we not, in all our acts of legislation, look at the consequences of the laws we make? And shall we, on one of the greatest subjects which can come before us, madly refuse to cast a glance at the future? What will be the war debt? The Senator from South Carolina estimated it at five hundred millions. Is this a trifling burden to lay upon the backs of our people? Is this a light load for weary generations to groan under? Remember that the poorest and the humblest man in the land will not be without his share of this burden, and must contribute his mite and his labor to its repayment. Is this a consideration to be kept out of sight? Will the President exclude it from his view? or will he not pause long before he incurs the fearful responsibility of casting such a burden upon them and their children, without some clear necessity for it?

On the other hand, while we look at the consequences of war, let us for a moment ponder on the wonders of our national progress and prosperity. Has there ever been a nation, since the foundation of the world, which exhibited such a spectacle of progress within the same length of time? Has the world ever seen a parallel to it? It seems as if the powers of the human intellect had just broken loose from the slumber of ages; as if the hands of man had acquired the power of giants to perform what was heretofore seemed to belong to fable. Look at the public works of this young republic, and say where has so much been done in the same space of time upon the face of the earth? It is a little more than two centuries since our forefathers, a feeble band, very few and very feeble, landed on the bleak shores of an unknown land. And what do we now behold? They have established liberty, and spread their empire across this broad continent, from sea to sea; they have overcome the wilderness, and filled it with cities; from a few hundred people they have already multiplied to twenty millions, and the child is born who will see that number swelled to one hundred millions, all animated with the spirit and energy of freemen, and pressing forward in the great cause of civilization and liberty.

This is our country!—our inheritance!—with all its present and prospective greatness! Our hearts burn within us at the contemplation. Patriotism, ambition itself, can scarcely suggest a wish that is not anticipated by its mighty progress. Why, then, should we be impatient? Why so impatient to get to-day, what, by the mere force of circumstances, by a destiny that cannot be controlled, will be yours to-morrow? Cannot we afford to *be* a little wise, a little patient? We are borne along upon a tide of prosperity with the speed of the wind. Can we not be satisfied? Why must we be trying artificial means to get on faster? This is the only way by which our progress can be successfully impeded. We are the great first-born of this continent. The continent is ours by a title indefeasible, irreversible, irresistible. I smile at all petty European endeavors to check us, by establishing what they denominate a "balance of power." I know it is natural on their part; and it provokes no feeling of resentment in my breast—it rather excites our pride of country. This republic is not seventy years old; as a nation it has not yet attained to the length of the life of man—it is justly and correctly spoken of as an "infant republic"—and yet we see it exciting the alarmed attention and policy of the kingdoms of Europe. But what can they effect? What can Mons. Guizot's fine drawn policy of a "balance of power" on this West-

ern continent, accomplish in stopping the march of this advancing people? We are th
day twenty millions of people; we shall soon be one hundred millions; where will
find his "balance" for this?

I remember, Mr. President, to have been once very much amused by an old memo
(now to be found in the Congressional library) addressed to the King of France by h
minister, the celebrated Count de Vergennes, in relation to this continent, and the polic
to be observed in respect to its various inhabitants. It was written something mo
than sixty years ago, about the time of our treaty of independence in 1783. The mi
ister there informs the King of a powerful and formidable tribe of Indians called Cher
kees, situated near to and on the western side of the Alleghany mountains, and he r
commends the policy of favoring and upholding them as a "*barrier* against the peop
of the United States"—mark that—(much laughter) "lest the people of the Unit
States," says the worthy count, "more ambitious than wise, should, at some future da
attempt to cross the heights of the Alleghany mountains, and look even to the far
lower Mississippi itself. (Renewed merriment through the chamber and galleries.)

The Cherokees were to restrain and confine our progress. There is the Count
Vergennes's "balance of power!" It has vanished before *us;* nor can Monsieur Gu
zot, at the present day, devise any that will not be equally fugitive and impotent. O
march has outstripped all their calculations, and they do not know how to measure th
progress and power that stir within us. We do not realize it ourselves. The day is fa
coming when our posterity will smile and wonder—if we do not ourselves live to smi
and wonder—at our present impatience and anxiety to get the "whole of Oregon," ju
as if it was not a part of that great continental inheritance that must fall to us, witho
a struggle, as soon as it was really suitable or desirable to us. Our power and progre
are founded in the very nature of things, and depend on principles of eternal truth. W
cannot avoid the great career that seems to have been assigned to and marked out for u
but by the grossest folly or wickedness. Let us only be true to ourselves, and take ca
of our Union. All the rest is certain—is but a natural consequence. The shadow,
rather the radiance, of your free institutions, will go before and prepare the way for yo
Your neighbors will seek the shelter of your laws or the security of your protectio
and all things that can gratify a just and noble ambition will be added to you. Yo
will seldom have occasion to exert your mighty power. Without wrong or violenc
without a blow, and without a wound, you may conquer more effectually than ever d
the Roman legions. And when that great moral power, springing from your examp
and your principles of liberty, is combined with your vastly increasing physic
strength, what is there that can resist or stay your progress and expansion? You a
the embodiment of the principles of civil liberty, and you must go forward, in the ver
nature of things, with all the rapidity that the moral force of those principles, and yo
amazing increase of physical power, can give. Beyond this there would seem to be n
thing for ambition to grasp at. Why, then, should we be so impatient to pluck th
fruit green to-day which to-morrow will fall ripe into our hands?

I do not say these things in any spirit of aggression or aggrandizement, or with a
desire to have my country usurp its neighbor's rights. No, sir; no. It is a part of th
elements of our conquering character, a part of the augury of our great career, that w
shall be just to all—that we shall violate no right—that we shall do no injury. Not f
ourselves only, but for the common race of man, we hold the sceptre of an empire suc
as never before was seen upon the earth. Do not, by precipitancy and a childish in
patience, mar the fortune which nature and destiny hold out to you.

The President of the United States will doubtless look at all this in the spirit whic
becomes his high station. No matter how an American President may ascend to th
chair of State, I would hope that there is a purification in the office itself sufficient
redeem the man—to make him politically new born, and to inspire him with principl
and aims worthy of the place he fills. Whatever vapors of party feeling and narrow an
selfish designs may float below, he is raised to a height where he may breathe a pur
air. From that eminence he can survey his whole country, and behold the migh
progress and the mighty works she is accomplishing under the auspices of peace.
he be not dull and perverse in his nature, he must contemplate the glorious scene wi

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ide and enthusiasm, and his heart must exult within him at the thought that he has en called to preside over it, and to lead his countrymen on to still greater and hap-er results. Patriotism could not so err—ambition itself could hardly be so blind and graded, as willingly to exchange such scenes and such prospects for the hazards of structive war.

If, after this notice shall be given into his hands, the President shall use it as a weapon offence, of menace, and of war, the responsibility will be upon him—the denuncia-ons of a betrayed people, and the just and lasting execrations of mankind, will fall on his head, and follow his name while its history endures.

But I feel persuaded, sir, that he can have no inducement to seek a war, or recklessly bring it upon his country. Yet war may come after he has done all that honor can ap-ove to prevent the evil. I trust it will not come. I want no war with England. It is wise and unworthy of us to act from, or indulge in, any mere feelings of national jeal-sy or prejudice, or to seek superiority by the humiliation of others. We shall hieve that superiority more surely and more honestly in elevating ourselves by the oper improvement and use of our own unlimited resources and means of national owth and prosperity. We can look forward with certainty to that not distant future, en, with our hundred millions and more of freemen, neither England nor France can mpare with us in political power.

They are great, heroic, and enlightened nations. We do not repine at that. We re-ice in their prosperity. Their greatness is not in our way. It helps us on in our reer. Their wealth, their improvement in arts, their spreading commerce, all minister us. I feel towards them neither envy, jealousy, nor fear.

I have felt surprised at the views which have been expressed by some Senators in course of this debate. Sir, the lugubrious views taken by the honorable Senator m New York opposite, (Mr. DICKINSON,) of all the former treaties and negotiations the United States excite commisseration. The review appears to make the honor-le gentleman quite melancholy; for he thinks that in all, or if not all, in the great ss of them at least, the people of the United States have been overreached. He is netrated with the conviction that our whole course, from the days of the Revolution this day, has exhibited towards the Government of Great Britain little else than one broken series of abjectness and servility. And our whole diplomatic history (not in spect to England only) seems to have filled the Senator with mingled sadness and in-gnation, and he speaks of it like a patriot mourning over the shame and decline of his untry. I cannot argue with the gentleman's sensibilities, but I must say, that I see occasion for his griefs. I look back with very different feelings, and wish we could assured that the *future* may do as well as the *past* has done for us.

Since our war of independence, we have neither gained nor lost any territory by ne-tiation with England. We have only adjusted unsettled boundaries with her. But if have gained nothing as respects her, our general diplomacy has still been neither dis-editable nor unsuccessful. Let me, sir, for the consolation of the gentleman, remind him t within little more than forty years we have acquired, by the peaceful means of that lomacy, the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Florida, and Texas, besides the regions that stretch away to the Rocky Mountains, and extend beyond them to the cific ocean. These acquisitions might satisfy an imperial ambition. But the honor-Senator's case seems to admit of no consolation but the possession of Oregon. Our imaginary sacrifices must be compensated, as he seems to think, by Oregon—"the hole of Oregon"—a country four thousand miles off, and so little known that the nate is disputing at this day what is its climate, and what is its soil.

We have been told that if the President shall give up a single inch of Oregon south 54° 40′ the country will be forever disgraced. Disgraced! Why, sir, do not gen-men feel that they do themselves wrong, that they do their country wrong, by apply-such inferences as these to that which has actually been done over and over again? d not Mr. Jefferson, in 1807, express an earnest wish that 49° should be our boun-ry on the west of the mountains, as it had been on the east of them? Did not Pres-ent Monroe offer 49° in 1818? Did not Mr. Gallatin, did not Mr. Clay, did not Mr. iams, did not General Jackson himself, by acquiescing in the convention of joint oc-

cupation, did they not all, in the language of these gentlemen, "disgrace the coun
forever?" Certainly; undeniably.

And, stranger yet, I understand the gentleman from Illinois, (Mr. Breese,) more b
ligerant on this question than any even of those who go the most resolutely for 54° 4
to say, that he wants no more compromises, no more negotiations; he is for mar
ing at once and taking possession of the whole territory, regardless of consequenc
Another Senator, the honorable gentleman from Michigan, (Mr. Cass,) says that
ought to have the whole; yet I was glad to hear him add, that the President acted
diciously in offering to compromise on the parallel of 49°. The Senator, to be su
would rather get up to 54° 40'; yet he is content, if he cannot get that, to put up w
49°. There, at least, we are together. If we can get Oregon up to 54° 40', let us
it by all means, and be glad to do it; but if the President shall say to us, I tried
best to get the whole for you, but I could get only up to 49°, and shall send us a tre
with that boundary, I trust the Senator from Michigan will agree to ratify it. He sa
we escaped a great danger by rejecting the British offer of arbitration, and that it wo
have left a "disgraceful scar" upon us. How does he infer that? Arbitration
an approved mode of settling controversies between nations. You have always offe
this as a mode of settlement. It has been peculiarly your own mode of arranging di
culties. You have offered it to others over and over again. In the case of the nor
eastern boundary you accepted as an arbiter one of the crowned heads of the
World. But if you are jealous of kings, and doubt their impartiality, (and there m
be reason for that,) there are other arbitrators in the world; arbitrators to whose awa
the proudest and the haughtiest nations would show their own true dignity by subm
ting. I refer neither to crowned heads, nor potentates, nor yet to civilians or lawy
merely, but generally, to the honest, liberal, wise, philanthropic and independent m
that are to be found in every Christian land. Out of these might easily be forme
tribunal to which no nation need to blush in submitting its claims. Such an arbitrati
is the proper emanation of this age; it is the homage due to intelligence; due to w
dom; due to experience; due to virtue; and every way worthy of a Republic.
my judgment the Administration, in rejecting the British proposition on this subje
have not only lost the opportunity of ensuring, in an unexceptionable manner, the a
icable settlement of the present dispute, but have lost also an inviting occasion of givi
to mankind the noble example of such a mode of arbitration.

And now, sir, I have a little more to say on another subject, although I fear I ha
detained the Senate too long already.

Among the subjects of grief presented by the "researches" of the Senator fr
New York, (Mr. Dickinson,) is an alleged interference of General Harrison's adm
istration with the courts of justice of New York, in McLeod's case. Perhaps I o
it to that gentleman, to myself, and to truth, to say a little on that subject. It is son
what hard, (said Mr. C. with a smile,) that I, who enjoyed for so brief a period the l
ury of office, should be involved in those grave and hazardous responsibilities to wh
the honorable Senator calls those who were agents in the transactions of that day. T
charge is, that there was an interference by the agents of this Government with the
gular course of justice in the State of New York. Now let me tell that honorable S
ator what was precisely the character and extent of the alleged "interference" wh
seems to have given him so much offence.

All are so well acquainted with McLeod's case, that I need only allude to its hist
in brief and general terms. During the civil war in Canada, and while certain refug
from that province, with some of our own citizens who sympathized with them, w
preparing and in the act of attempting an invasion of it, across the Niagara river fr
the American side, a body of armed men passed over that river from Canada, in
night, and seized and destroyed the steamboat Caroline, then lying on the New Y
shore, and which they alleged was in the service of the invaders. In this attack
seizure of the boat, a man by the name, as well as I recollect, of Durfee was killed.

This occurrence naturally produced great excitement along that whole front
Shortly afterwards, a British subject and inhabitant of Canada, having come into
State of New York, was there arrested and imprisoned upon charges of having b

gaged in the attack and destruction of the Caroline, and of having shot and killed rfee. He was thereupon indicted for murder in one of the courts of the State of w York, and his trial was set for some day in the latter part of March, 1841. Great pular prejudice and excitement prevailed against him, and it was apprehended that blic passion and vengeance would be but little regardful of any defence he might be e to make. In this state of the case, General Harrison was inaugurated as Presi- t on the 4th day of the same month of March, 1841. In a few days afterwards, British minister, by the direction of his Government, renewed, in a formal and y emphatic manner, a demand for the release of McLeod, avowing that the enter- se which had resulted in the destruction of the Caroline and the killing of Durfee been planned and executed under the authority of his Government; that it was a blic transaction for which and its consequences the Government was alone responsi- and that the individuals who had acted in it had but performed the duty of subjects obeying the orders of their Government, and could not be made amenable to our laws what they so done, without a violation of the plainest principles of national law; that, therefore, if McLeod had committed the acts with which he was charged, he not liable to be prosecuted for it as a criminal, and that it was the bounden duty of British Government to protect him.

General Harrison fully recognised the principle of national law relied on by the Bri- minister as the basis of his demand, and his wish was that it should be fairly applied nd carried out in the case of McLeod. That case had thus become blended with our ign relations. It had become a national concern. Upon its issue might depend the stion of peace or war. As the organ of intercourse with foreign nations, the President ht well feel, and did feel, a particular solicitude that the case should be disposed of h a sacred regard to justice and law. It had acquired a new and important character ffecting the foreign relations of the United States, and it was the duty of the Presi- t, charged to take care of those relations, to look to it as a matter in which not wY ork only but the whole Union was concerned.

Under these circumstances, General Harrison expressed the wish that I (then Attor- General) would go and attend the trial of McLeod. It was inconvenient for me to o; I expressed my reluctance, and suggested the appointment of another to per- n the duty. But he insisted that I should go, and I submitted.

My instructions from President Harrison were, in effect, that I should attend the trial, ke myself fully acquainted with the case, and, though not required to appear as nsel, I was to take care, generally, that a full trial was had—that the defence was onducted as to present all proper questions, and, if the decision was against the pri- er, to see that the facts were all so placed on record that the courts of the United es might revise or take cognizance of the same, if it should appear that they had judicial power to do so.

hese instructions were afterwards drawn up (with some enlargement and more in il) in the form of a letter to me by Mr. Webster, (then Secretary of State,) but, as letter imports on its face, the instructions were from the President. They were ived by me, in the first instance, from the President personally. To his authority e did I consider myself subordinate in the matter.

s Attorney General of the United States, I was not subordinate to the Secretary of e. I knew this, and so did he. The instructions were the President's. The Se- ary drew them up in writing, and I executed them as far as they were executed.

hose instructions were long since communicated to Congress, and form part of our ic documents.

he object of General Harrison, in all this, was but to discharge his duty, and to en- him to show that he had done so.

nder my instructions I set out for Lockport to attend the trial of McLeod. When ived at Albany I waited on Governor Seward and submitted to him a copy of my ructions, and also a copy of the letter of Mr. Fox, the British Minister, demanding release McLeod. We conversed freely and fully on the whole subject. Gover- Seward assured me that McLeod was entirely innocent, and that he had seen or had proof in his possession, to show beyond all doubt that he was not present but was

in Canada at the time the Caroline was destroyed and Durfee killed. He further stat
that he could not or would not order a nol. pros.; that he would not pardon him befo
trial—but if tried and condemned, that he would pardon him, and that he should not
executed or punished. But he expressed a perfect assurance, that whenever tri
McLeod must be acquitted on the evidence of his absence and innocence, and he s
that would be the best mode of bringing the matter to a close, and the most satisfacto
to the public mind, which was greatly excited against McLeod. In this conclusion
the Governor's I acquiesced; but as we had just learned at Albany that the trial wou
not take place at the appointed time in March, and must, for some cause that I do
now remember, be necessarily continued, and as the demand of Mr. Fox was
McLeod's "immediate" release, I apprehended there might arise some difficulty from
further detention and imprisonment. We consulted about this difficulty, and came
the conclusion, that as Mr. Fox had said, in the close of his letter, if any "harm" w
done to McLeod, Great Britain would consider it as cause of offence, he must be und
stood as having reference to the execution of any sentence of condemnation that mig
be passed on him; and that no danger would probably result from his detention a
trial, as in the event of his conviction the Governor was determined to pardon him.
this determination I was authorized to inform the President. The Governor was
formed, by my letter of instructions, that the President would be pleased at his orderi
at once a dismission of the prosecution, if he had the power so to do; and I, no do
in furtherance of the President's views, endeavored, by such suggestions as occurred
me, to sustain the propriety of the course indicated by him. But as the Governor
clined that course, saying, I believe, that he had no power to direct a nol. pros., I acq
esced in the course which he stated he would pursue, and said to him, I believe, tha
supposed it would be satisfactory to the President.

This, I believe, is the whole substance of the matter. Gov. Seward complained
no interference, though he did state that he had heard it was contemplated at Washi
ton to appoint Mr. Spencer district attorney of the United States for one of the N
York districts, and that he thought the appointment objectionable because of his hav
been employed as counsel for McLeod.

It is not true, sir, that in my intercourse with Gov. Seward on this subject, any th
was said or suggested by me for any purpose of intimidation. The simple object
to put him in possession of all the information the General Government possessed, an
its views in relation to McLeod's case, and to obtain such co-operation on his part
was suitable to the occasion. And nothing was said on the subject that was impro
to be said by me, or improper to be addressed to him.

And now, sir, I ask the honorable Senator, (Mr. DICKINSON,) in full view of my
structions, and my agency under them, what he finds to condemn as an "interferenc
with the courts of the State of New York? I will not dispute with him about a
but if he means to say that the Administration of Gen. Harrison was guilty of any
proper course in regard to the judicial authorities of New York, or any of its functi
aries, I deny his accusation as totally unfounded. All that was done by it in relatio
McLeod's case, was required of it by the plainest and strictest obligations of duty.
precedents were necessary to sanction the course of that Administration, in a matte
such obvious duty, they are amply furnished by our past history. During the Pr
dency of Gen. Washington, he addressed to the Governors of the States a circular
ter *admonishing* them as to the performance of certain duties of theirs, that concer
and were connected with the General Government. In the Administration of Mr.
ferson, Mr. Wirt was employed to assist the district attorney in the prosecution of Aa
Burr, at Richmond, in Virginia; and Mr. Bibb was in like manner employed by
Federal Government to assist the district attorney of Ohio in the prosecution of
same individual, when the prosecution was transferred from Virginia to the Stat
Ohio. Instances might easily be multiplied, but it is needless. The Senator him
(Mr. DICKINSON) must, I hope, be convinced of the groundlessness of his own c
plaints and accusations, and I part with pleasure from the subject.

The chief reason with me, sir, for agreeing to the measure of giving notice to E
land is the belief that the convention which it is intended to abrogate cannot long

ue to be an adequate security for the peace of the two countries. And my object by the abrogation of that convention, to impose on the parties the whole weight of at moral obligation or necessity that will then rest upon them to settle, permanently d definitively, their dispute about Oregon.

The suspension of the negotiation seemed to have left the parties in no good humor ith each other. The resolution under consideration was, therefore, drawn in such ms as t) meet the whole exigency of the case, and not only to exclude all appearance defiance and hostility in our proceeding, but to manifest that our object was peace d amicable settlement, and to indicate, further, that to that end we desired to see a newal of the suspended negotiation. The resolution expresses these purposes, and more, in language of respect and amity, suitable to the occasion and to ourselves. If it be adopted, and the negotiation be resumed in the spirit of this resolution, I can- t doubt its successful termination. It can hardly be that the Executive will be re- dless of the declared will of Congress on the subject. Since the suspension of the gotiation last summer, the negotiators, Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Pakenham, seem to ve been confronting each other in diplomatic dignity and silence, each perhaps wait- for and desiring the other to speak the first word. These distinguished gentlemen, both of whom I have the greatest respect, will no longer hesitate—they will be sen- le that it will be rather better a good deal should be abated on points of etiquette, n that their countrymen should be required to slaughter each other—they will be sible, sir, that honor will be due to him who shall speak the *first* brave word for ce. The negotiations will be resumed, and, if conducted with wisdom and modera- they cannot fail to lead to a peaceful settlement of all our differences. War can- ensue without a high degree of criminality on the part of the one Government or the er.

My friend from Arkansas (Mr. SEVIER) complains of this resolution because, instead enjoining it upon him, it leaves to the President the discretion and responsibility of ing the notice. It seems to me altogether proper that it should be so. He has re- mmended to us to authorize the giving of notice, and must bear the responsibility of measure. It is but suitable to his high office, as the organ of intercourse with foreign ions, that he should exercise some discretion, and take some responsibility on the asion.

The Hon. Senator from Texas (Mr. HOUSTON) would prefer what he calls a naked ice. He does not like apologies, and would not appear before the British Premier ith bated breath," asking terms of him.

trust, sir, that I know how to appreciate the honor and dignity of my country too l to be capable of proposing anything derogatory to either. I must ask the honor- e Senator whether his remarks were intended to apply to this resolution.

Mr. HOUSTON explained, and said that, in the remarks referred to, he had no refer- e to the resolution of the Senator from Kentucky—his remarks were general in their racter and application.)

Mr. CRITTENDEN resumed. I was certain the Senator could find nothing in the tone his resolution deserving his animadversion, and we should concur entirely in the rep- ation of everything like humbleness or servility in our intercourse with foreign na- s. I congratulate the gentleman on his return to our national brotherhood, and I st assure him that he brings with him no more of the genuine American feeling, in abhorrence of everything mean and humiliating, than he will find cordially and fully ertained and reciprocated here. There are some in this country who seem to think our patriotism is to be measured by the contempt with which we speak of other na- s, and that our national character is to be sustained and advanced by holding the guage of defiance towards the rest of the world. We should discard altogether such e ideas, and learn that the *true honor* of a nation consists in its *probity*, and the n dignity and courage with which it maintains the right.

The Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations (Mr. ALLEN) has indulged in yle of remark and invective that seems to me unsuited to the occasion, or to any pose of reconciliation or amicable adjustment between this country and England. speaks of England and her power with contempt, and describes her as a huge, mis-

shapen "pauper," whose joints are so loose and ill-fitted that she totters to her fal and is incapable of standing the shock of a war with this country. He sees, course, but little difficulty or danger in such a war. If such language could hav any effect, and we were seeking to provoke war with England, it would be appro priate enough to the purpose; but even then there would be no policy in thus unde rating an adversary, or deceiving ourselves as to his power and prowess. It would b much wiser to overrate the danger of the conflict, and prepare like men to meet i England is a great, powerful, and valiant nation; and to deny it would be but to sho our ignorance and folly. We ourselves are but part of the same warlike race. En land fears no enemy, and we fear not her. But there is in this no reason why w should *seek* war with each other. Our common origin and common character, indepe dent of other considerations, should rather operate as bonds of mutual respect and frien ship. But whenever the conduct of Great Britain shall make it necessary or prop for us to meet her in the field, in the defence of our rights or our honor, we shall b ready for the encounter; and shame be to him who then stops to count cost or danger.

Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas, (Mr. ASHLEY,) as I recollect, deprecat all appeals to the "horrors of war." He insists that it is an unfair mode of argumen and seems to fear that it might agitate our nerves and frighten us from his favorite lin of 54° 40.

I shall not, for myself, say a word about those "horrors of war." Indeed, I so f concur with the Senator as to agree, that, when war becomes necessary, we ought n to be deterred from it by the mere consideration of its horrors.

To relieve us, however, from all alarm and panic, that Senator assures us that wa with all its "horrors," can do us *comparatively* but little mischief, and especially th it will not diminish our population. To verify this statement, he re rred us to certa cypherings and calculations of his, by which it appeared, and no doubt correctly, th according to the natural increase of our present population, four hundred and eighty-o males per day attained the age of eighteen years, and supposing the war to destr these, and no more, the conclusion is arrived at that war will not diminish our numbe or impair our strength—that, at the end of it, our population will be just as numero as it was at the beginning. The gentleman's arithmetic seemed to be good, and y there was one little circumstance which he seemed to have overlooked, and which mig yet very materially affect his calculations. It was this: that he saved only the old men, and that it might, therefore, admit of serious and sober doubt how long they cou exactly keep up that natural increase on which his tables seem to have been founde (Great and continued merriment.)

It is not a little singular that a gentleman who deprecates so much all mention of t "horrors of war," should himself have brought forward or used any argument or c culation that could suggest ever so remotely an idea so overwhelming and extravag as the destruction and slaughter of the entire youth of the country. I know that t gentleman has used it as a mere hypothesis on which to make his calculations, but ev in that form it suggests a more terrible idea of war than all else that I have hea But, sir, none of these painted or imaginary horrors frighten or move us. When w becomes necessary for the vindication of our rights or honor, we will make it and m it like men, and through all its horrors we can then look to the glory that is beyond. such a war as that you may rely with confidence upon the patriotism and courage our countrymen. With the generous ardor of their age, the whole youth of the cou try will, at your summons, rally around the standard of their country. I can answ for those that I more particularly represent—the youth of Kentucky. They will ta the field at the first signal. But I do not want to see their brave young blood, that ou to be as dear to me as my own, wasted and poured out in idle, foolish, or unnecess war. In a good cause—a proper, patriotic war—you will have them all; and not th only, but the youth of the whole land. They will all come up to fight your battles not all, I trust, to perish, according to the fatal hypothesis of the Senator from Ark sas, but to conquer in the righteous cause of their country. Those that perish in s a field will die nobly, and Victory will wipe away the tears their Country must sh for their fall.

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